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Scott W. Lang, Esq.
Lang, Xifaras & Bullard
115 Orchard Street
New Bedford, MA 02740
Michael J. Murray, Esq.
Director of Employee and Labor Relations
One Ashburton Place, Room 1401
Boston, MA 02108-1696
Amy Laura Davidson, Esq.
Sandulli Grace, P.C.
44 School Street, Suite 1100
Boston, MA 02108
Re:

SUP-16-5218, Board of Higher Education/Department of Higher
Education and Ely Dorsey
SUPL-16-5149, Massachusetts Community College Council,
MTA/NEA and Ely Dorsey and Michael Marks

Dear Mr. Lang, Mr. Murray and Ms. Davidson:
Ely Dorsey (Dorsey) seeks review of a Department of Labor Relations
(DLR) Investigator’s dismissal of the above-referenced charges of prohibited
practice. 1 Both charges relate to a teaching provision in a successor collective

1

The Investigator granted Michael Marks’ (Marks) motion to intervene in Case
No. SUPL-16-5149 on June 17, 2016. Marks also seek review of the dismissal
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bargaining agreement that the Massachusetts Community College Council,
MTA/NEA (MCCC or Union) negotiated in 2015-2016 with the Board of Higher
Education (Employer) on behalf of the bargaining unit of full-time and part-time
day faculty and professional staff it represents at the Commonwealth’s fifteen
community colleges (Day Unit). After reviewing the investigative records and
the parties’ arguments on review, the Commonwealth Employment Relations
Board (CERB) affirms both dismissals for the reasons explained below. 2
Background Common to Both Charges 3
The Parties
The Employer is the employer for collective bargaining purposes for all
employees of the state’s public community colleges. The Union, who is the
Respondent in SUPL-16-5149, represents two bargaining units of employees
employed at these colleges: the Day Unit described above and the Division of
Continuing Education (DCE) Unit, which is comprised of professional employees
teaching in the Employer’s DCE. Dorsey and Marks, the Charging Parties in
SUPL-16-5149, are members of the DCE Unit and are employed at Bristol
Community College (Bristol).
Collective Bargaining between the Employer and the Union
The DCE and Day units bargain separately and are parties to two
different collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the Employer. It is
undisputed, however, that the same union, i.e., the MCCC, represents both
units. Both units are subject to the same by-laws and are governed by the same
Board of Directors and officers. 4 Under the by-laws, the Union’s President and
of that charge. With respect to SUPL-16-5149, Dorsey and Marks are
collectively referred to as the “Charging Parties.”
2

The charges were investigated and dismissed separately. Because they arise
out of the same facts and circumstances, however, the CERB has decided to
consolidate them for review.

3

These facts are taken from the Investigation record, including the parties’
investigation exhibits and the dismissal letter.

4

The twenty-one member Board of Directors is comprised of four officers, fifteen
chapter representatives that represent both Day and DCE Unit members, and
two at-large DCE representatives. On review, Dorsey claims that the
Investigator erroneously found that twelve out of twenty-one Board of Director
members are DCE representatives He claims that the Board contains only two
DCE representatives. Dorsey is correct that the make-up of the Board includes
two at-large DCE representatives. However, the Investigator found that during
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Vice President serve as ex officio members of each unit’s negotiating teams.
The Day Unit’s negotiating team is comprised of a minimum of five Day Unit
members. During the successor negotiations at issue here, Tom Kearns
(Kearns), who is a member of both units, was appointed as a Day Unit
bargaining team member. Likewise, the DCE negotiating team is comprised of
a minimum of five DCE Unit members. All negotiating team members are
appointed by the Board of Directors.
2015-2016 Day Unit Negotiations/Teaching Hours
The Day Unit’s collective bargaining agreement (CBA) expired on June
30, 2015. The Union and the Employer began exchanging proposals for a
successor agreement sometime in July 2015. At the July 16, 2015 negotiating
session, the Employer proposed amending Section 12.03 B.3 5, of the Day Unit
CBA to add a provision that “No Day Division programs or courses shall be
scheduled to begin after 6:30 p.m.” At the time of the proposal, Section
12.03.B.3 defined the instructional workload of Day Unit members as follows:
The workload for faculty members shall include instructional
workload and non-instructional workload. . . The faculty customary
work week shall be Monday through Friday, but in no case shall a
faculty member be required to work more than five (5) days in any
seven (7) consecutive day period [except in exceptional cases].
The Union initially rejected this proposal due to concerns that it might be
unlawful6 and because of the negative effect it might have on both the Day
Unit’s and DCE Unit’s workload. The Union proposed instead that Day Unit
faculty teach evening courses only if the member requested the class and the
supervisor agreed, and if the purpose of the extension was to meet bona fide

the relevant time period, twelve of the twenty-one 2015-2016 Board members
were DCE Unit members, not representatives. This means, that in addition to
the two-at large members, there were ten other representatives, either Chapter
representative or officers, who also were members of the DCE unit. We
therefore decline to disturb the finding.
5

Section 12.03 is titled “Workload of Full-Time Faculty.” Section B is titled
“Instructional Workload.”
6

The Investigator noted that there was no further information in the record
regarding what law the proposal might violate. She further noted, however, that
M.G.L. c. 15A, 26 provides in relevant part that, “[e]ach public institution of
higher education may conduct evening classes, provided such classes are
operated at no expense to the commonwealth.”

3
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programmatic needs. 7 As negotiations extended through the fall, the Employer
continued to advance an extended teaching schedule proposal and, in
November, indicated that such a proposal was one of its “must haves.” 8 It
nevertheless modified its proposal on November 12, 2015 by proposing
assigning Day Unit faculty to classes that began no later than 5:45 p.m. upon
mutual agreement between the faculty member and the college president. The
Union in turn advanced counterproposals that were aimed at limiting the times
and conditions under which Day Unit faculty could be assigned classes after
4:00 p.m.
For example, on November 24, 2015, the Union made a
counterproposal that Day Unit faculty could be assigned courses with start times
between 4:00 and 5:15 p.m.; any classes that began after 5:15 p.m. could only
be assigned for a bona fide programmatic reason. In response, the Employer
proposed that it assign Day Unit faculty courses that started between 4:00 and
5:30 p.m. The Union rejected this proposal. On December 21, 2015, the Union
proposed allowing a Day Unit member to be assigned courses with start times
between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. only upon mutual written agreement, except that
the Employer could assign courses after 4:00 p.m. for bona fide programmatic
needs. The Employer then proposed having unrestricted authority to assign
classes beginning on or after 4:00 p.m. to new faculty hires. The Union also
rejected this proposal.
Throughout negotiations, the Union kept members of both units apprised
of its negotiations with the Day Unit, including information regarding the teaching
time extension proposal, through newsletters and bargaining updates well as in
other communications and meetings that are described in detail in the dismissal
letter. 9 For example, in a September 4, 2015 “Talking Points” memo that was
sent to Chapter leaders, the Employer’s proposal to expand the full-time faculty
workload to include classes beginning up to 6:30 was listed as one of the
“Lowlights from Management’s Proposals.” The December 5, 2015 Update
indicates that one of the issues “under active discussion” is “class start times as
part of the day unit workload.” In early February 2016, the Union posted a
newsletter on its website and also mailed the newsletter to both Day Unit and
DCE Unit members, stating that the “Day bargaining team is mindful of how
agreements reached might impact adjunct faculty and is determined to protect
their rights as well.”

7

These conditions already existed at certain colleges.

8

Earlier, on September 30, 2015, the Employer told the Day Unit bargaining
team that it had three priorities for the successor agreement: on-line teaching,
student learning outcomes and expanding the Day Unit members’ teaching time.
9

Dorsey does not dispute that the communications described in the dismissal
letter took place.
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On February 15, 2016, the Day Unit and the Employer reached a
tentative agreement that included the following amendment to Section 12.03
B.3:
a. Upon mutual agreement between the faculty member and the
College President or President’s designee a faculty member may
be assigned courses that have start times commencing on or after
4 p.m. and as late as 5:00 p.m. as part of the faculty member’s day
unit workload.
b. To meet bona fide programmatic needs, such as accreditation,
and upon written mutual agreement between the faculty member
and the college President or President’s designee, a faculty
member may be assigned courses that have start times
commencing on or after 4 p.m. as part of the faculty member’s day
unit workload.
c. Within two (2) weeks of assignment, the MCCC Chapter shall be
notified whenever a faculty member is scheduled to teach a course
that commences on or after 4 p.m. as part of the faculty member’s
day unit workload. 10
The Union insisted on the third requirement in order to monitor evening class
assignments and to address issues that arose for Day or DCE Unit members.
On February 16, 2016, the chair of the Day Unit negotiating team
distributed the tentative agreement and a summary to the Board of Directors.
The Board discussed the tentative agreement, including the class time issue,
and no Board member raised objections. All but one Board member, who
abstained, recommended that it be ratified.
10

On review, the Charging Parties argue that the Investigator erroneously
overlooked the fact that the MCCC admitted at the investigation that it
“transferred and sacrificed DCE work for Day Unit retroactive and future raises.”
The CERB is unable to tell from the investigation record whether the MCCC
made such an admission during the in-person investigation and we therefore
decline to add it. In its response to the Charging Parties’ request for review,
however, the Union notes that:
By February 2016, the Day unit was under the gun to conclude
negotiations so that the contract could be funded in FY 2016. If
that didn’t occur, the Day unit would lose any retroactive pay and
their first year wage increase.
Accordingly, it accepted an
extremely limited proposal concerning classes after 4 pm that was
designed to protect the DCE unit as much as possible.

5
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Thereafter, the Union posted the tentative agreement on its website and
mailed Day Unit members a summary of it and a cover letter containing the
website link. The Union also held question and answer sessions at the fifteen
chapter sites. Dorsey attended the meeting held in Bristol. During this meeting,
he protested about the extension of Day Unit class times. The record does not
reflect that concerns about this provision were raised by members at any other
information sessions.
On February 2, 2016, Dorsey asked the Union about the right of DCE
Unit members to vote on the Day Unit contract. On March 9, 2015, at a meeting
held for all Day Unit and DCE Unit members, a Union field representative
informed those present that DCE Unit members could not participate in the Day
Unit’s ratification vote. Dorsey and other unidentified bargaining unit members
objected, complaining that the Union had violated their rights. On March 14,
2016, MTA General Counsel Ira Fader (Fader) wrote a letter to Union President
Joseph LeBlanc (LeBlanc) stating that he was responding to LeBlanc’s question
of whether DCE members were entitled to vote on the tentative Day Unit
agreement. 11 Fader’s “short answer” to the question was that there was no right
for members in one bargaining unit to participate in a ratification vote for another
bargaining unit’s contract. Fader opined: “The fact that the contract to be ratified
has an impact on or explicitly mentions another bargaining unit does not create
a voting right for members of the second unit.”
Fader’s “longer answer” was that it was not unusual for one unit’s
bargaining agreement to have an impact on the rights of members of another
unit. Fader indicated that the teaching time provision at issue in this case was
one such provision. Specifically, Fader stated that this provision, “affect[ed]
DCE’s interests because DCE has traditionally taught courses after 4:00 p.m.”
Fader further indicated in the letter that the DCE Unit’s contract was silent on
the right to teach all courses after 4:00 p.m., but that the DCE unit had the right
to demand to bargain over any change in existing practice and that the
Employer would be “well-advised to work with the DCE unit to resolve an issues
that arise in connection with post-4:00 p.m. assignments to Day Unit members.”
On March 23, 2016, the Day Unit members ratified the tentative
agreement, with 965 members in favor and 91 opposed.

11

The investigation record contains no information about LeBlanc’s actual
inquiry, e.g., when it was made, whether it was oral or in writing, etc.
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Prohibited Practice Charges
SUP-16-5218
On May 2, 2016, Dorsey filed a prohibited practice charge against the
Employer alleging that:
The . . .[Employer], by failing to bargain and negotiate in good faith,
by dominating, interfering, restraining, and coercing the Day Unit
into reaching an agreement that violates the terms of the DCE Unit
agreement, the [Employer] has engaged in prohibited practices in
violation of M.G.L. c. 150E, §§6, 10(a)(1), (2), & (5).
In an attachment to the Charge, Dorsey further alleged that the “proposed
additions to the [collective bargaining agreement] between the Day unit and the
Employer stand to significantly and negatively impact the DCE unit members'
wages, hours, and workload and the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement between the DCE unit and [the Employer].” The charge further
asserted that the Employer “failed to take into account the terms of [the
collective bargaining agreement with DCE] in its negotiations with the Day unit.”
On July 11, 2016, the Employer filed a Motion to Dismiss the Charge
(Motion to Dismiss) and Memorandum of Law arguing that Dorsey has no
standing "to assert rights and interests under the law and collective bargaining
agreement." On July 29, 2016, Dorsey filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss contending that he did have standing.
On August 1, 2016, the Investigator, without conducting an in-person
investigation, issued a ruling granting the Employer's Motion to Dismiss on both
procedural and substantive grounds. She dismissed the Section 10(a)(5) and
(2) allegations on grounds that Dorsey, as an individual, had no standing to
bring such charges. The Investigator found that Dorsey had standing to bring
an independent Section 10(a)(1) allegation, but dismissed the allegation on its
merits. 12
Dorsey filed a request for review with the CERB pursuant to DLR Rule
456 CMR 15.04(3) challenging virtually all aspects of the Investigator’s analysis.
We affirm the dismissal of charge against the Employer for the reasons set forth
below, addressing the Section 10(a)(2) allegations first.

12

The Investigator reasoned that holding an investigation with respect to
Dorsey’s Section 10(a)(1) allegation that the Employer interfered, restrained and
coerced employees by bargaining with the exclusive bargaining representative
of another unit would “serve no practical purpose and would not effectuate the
purposes of the Law.”
7
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The Investigator dismissed this aspect of the charge for lack of standing
based on the CERB’s statement in Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
Joseph F. Poitras, Jr. (Poitras), 6 MLC 1054, 1055, n. 1, SUP-2150 (May 15,
1979) that Section 10(a)(2) allegations “inherently relate to organizations and
not individuals.”
Dorsey challenges this conclusion on review claiming
that Johnston v School Committee of Watertown, 404 Mass. 23 (1989), which
issued after the Poitras decision, accords individuals standing to bring charges
that are typically brought by unions in situations where the individual has first
attempted to seek relief under the grievance procedure. Dorsey claims that he
filed an “informal grievance” with the MCCC claiming that DCE Unit members
should have the right to vote on the ratification of the Day Unit agreement and
that their “statutory collective bargaining rights” had been and continued to be
violated. Dorsey also claims that the other CERB Section 10(a)(2) decisions
cited by the Investigator are inapposite. In response, the Employer, argues
that Johnston is inapposite because, among other things, Dorsey did not file a
formal grievance. It also claims Dorsey’s assertions that the Employer
dominated the Day Unit’s bargaining team are “fanciful” and “untrue” and thus,
the Investigator properly dismissed this allegation. We affirm this aspect of the
dismissal for the following reasons.
First, Dorsey cites to no decisions arising under Chapter 150E that,
explicitly or implicitly recognize the right of an individual employee to bring a
charge alleging a Section 10(a)(2) violation. Indeed, since Poitras issued in
1979, the DLR has consistently dismissed Section 10(a)(2) charges brought by
individual employees. See, e.g., Fitchburg School Committee and William P.
Caron 9 MLC 1399, MUP-4511 (September 1, 1982); City of Holyoke and Arthur
Therrien, 23 MLC 121, 122, n. 5, MUP-9468 (January 31, 1995); City of Boston
and John McSweeney, 22 MLC 1488, n.1, MUP-9967 (February 9,
1996); Boston Water and Sewer and Richard Fowler, 26 MLC 61, n. 1, MUP1677 (December 16, 1999); Commonwealth of MA and Jan Pacheco, SUP-065254 (Order of Dismissal, July 16,2005).
Dorsey’s reliance on Johnston does not change this result. Johnston
issued before the Appeals Court issued a decision addressing the standing
issue raised here. In Pattison v. Labor Relations Commission (Pattison), 30
Mass. App. Ct. 9 (1991) further rev. den’d 409 Mass. 1104 (1991) the Court
upheld the CERB’s determination that individuals do not have standing to assert
a union’s bargaining rights under Chapter 150E, even in the face of a union’s
breach of a duty of fair representation. 13 The Court agreed that a “contrary rule
13

Dorsey claims that he filed an “informal grievance” with the MCCC. As noted
above, the Employer disputes this fact. We need not resolve this dispute
however. Even if were to assume that Dorsey’s complaints to the MCCC about
the Day Unit’s negotiations constitute a grievance, and even if there were
probable cause to believe that MCCC violated its duty of fair representation to
him (which there is not, see below), under the Pattison decision, Dorsey and
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/71
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would interfere with the union’s general prerogative to decide what it will do
about alleged bargaining violations, and would interfere also with the employer’s
natural and justified reliance on having one partner in the bargaining process
rather than a multitude.” Id. at 23 (citing Peabody Federation of Teachers v.
Peabody School Committee, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 410, 414-415 (1990)). Notably,
in so holding, the Court expressly rejected Pattison’s argument that Johnston
supported her right to bring a claim against her employer. 30 Mass. App. Ct. at
24, n. 18. We likewise reject Dorsey’s argument that Johnston confers standing
upon him to bring a Section 10(a)(2) claim or any claim that inherently relates to
the rights of exclusive representatives and not individuals. 14
Section 10(a)(5) Allegations
For the same reasons, we reject Dorsey’s claim that the Investigator
erred when she dismissed his Section 10(a)(5) and derivative, Section 10(a)(1)
allegation for lack of standing. As discussed above, Pattison conclusively
resolved this issue in 1990 and Dorsey’s efforts to distinguish that decision are
not persuasive.
Section 10(a)(1) (Derivative and Independent)
The Investigator also considered whether the Employer’s conduct
constituted an independent violation of Section 10(a)(1) of the Law. 15 On the
face of the charge, Dorsey alleged, among other things, that the Employer had
interfered, restrained and coerced “the MCCC and Day unit into reaching a
[collective bargaining agreement] that violates the DCE unit’s collective
bargaining agreement and the rights of the DCE members.” The Investigator
dismissed this allegation on the merits. As a practical matter, she found that
Dorsey could not allege restraint and coercion of a bargaining unit of which he
was not a member. She further found that that the Day Unit and the Employer
had negotiated in good faith and reached a CBA that was ratified by members.
On those facts, the Investigator found no basis to conclude that such
negotiations could restrain and coerce individuals in the exercise of their rights
under Section 2 of the Law.

Marks would still not have standing to file a charge under Chapter 150E
asserting the Union’s rights.
14

Although Pattison arose under Section 10(a)(5) of the Law, its reasoning
applies equally in circumstances where, as here, an individual brings a charge
alleging that both his union’s and his employer’s conduct during collective
bargaining violated the Law.
15

In light of her dismissal of the Section 10(a)(2) and Section 10(a)(5)
allegations, the Investigator dismissed the derivative Section 10(a)(1) allegation.
9
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On review, Dorsey claims that the Investigator incorrectly limited the
restraint and coercion prohibited under Section 10(a)(1) to rights guaranteed
under Section 2 of the Law. Dorsey argues that nothing in the text of Section
10(a)(1) limits its scope in this manner and, paraphrasing his charge, argues
that the Employer “interfered, restrained and coerced the MCCC’s Day Unit into
agreeing to a Day Unit CBA provision that would inhibit the wages, hours, and
workload rights of the DCE unit that had been bargained for and guaranteed to
the DCE unit under M.G.L. c. 150E.” There are several flaws in this argument.
First, Dorsey’s theory of the Section 10(a)(1) violation is, for all intents
and purposes, the same as his theory underlying the Sections 10(a)(2) and (5)
violations – that the Employer committed an unfair labor practice by negotiating
a CBA provision with the Union that extended Day Unit members’ teaching
hours to the alleged detriment of DCE unit members. As repeatedly stated
above, however, Chapter 150E does not confer upon individual employees the
right to attempt to enforce an employer’s duty to bargain in good faith. Pattison,
30 Mass. App. Ct. at 23-24.
Second, the Investigator correctly cited decades of black letter law for the
proposition that a public employer violates Section 10(a)(1) of the Law when it
engages in conduct that may reasonably be said to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 2 of the
Law. See, e.g., Quincy School Committee, 27 MLC 83, 91, MUP-1986
(December 29, 2000)(emphasis added); Town of Athol, 25 MLC 208, 212, MUP1448 (June 11, 1999); Town of Winchester, 19 MLC 1591, 1595, MUP-7514
(December 22,1992); Groton-Dunstable Regional School Committee, 15 MLC
1551, 1555, MUP-6748 (March 20, 1989) and cases cited therein. 16 Despite
Dorsey’s insistence that this is an incorrect reading of the Law, he points to no
provision of Chapter 150E that guarantees to employees the “right” to any
wages, hours or terms and conditions of employment outside of that which their
union has negotiated on their behalf. This principal is embodied in the text of
Section 2 itself, which grants employees the right to bargain collectively “through
representatives of their own choosing on questions of wages, hours, and other
16

Section 2 of the Law states:
Employees shall have the right of self-organization and the right to
form, join, or assist any employee organization for the purpose of
bargaining collectively through representatives of their own
choosing on questions of wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, and to engage in lawful, concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, free from interference, restraint, or coercion. An
employee shall have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities, except to the extent of making such payment of service
fees to an exclusive representative as provided in section twelve.
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terms and conditions of employment.” (Emphasis added). Section 6 of the Law
also makes this explicit insofar as it requires the “employer and the exclusive
representative” to “negotiate in good faith over terms and conditions of
employment.” 17
For all of these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of the Section 10(a)(1)
allegation and dismiss the Case No. SUP-16-5218 in its entirety. 18
SUPL-16-5149
Dorsey filed this charge on March 22, 2016 alleging that the MCCC had
engaged in prohibited practices within the meaning of Section 6, 10(b)(1 and
10(b)(2) of the Law. The Investigator conducted an in-person investigation on
June 22, 2016 and dismissed the charge for lack of standing on September 22,
2016. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the dismissal of the 10(b)(2)
allegation for lack of standing but dismiss the Section 10(b)(1) allegation on its
merits.
The face of the charge stated:
This action is for interference, restraint and coercion on the part of
the [MCCC] for entering into an agreement on behalf of its FullTime and Part-Time Day and Professional unit members that
violates and fails to protect the rights of the [DCE] unit members,
fails to meet the standard of bargaining collectively in good faith
17

Because Dorsey does not argue that the Employer’s conduct restrained,
interfered with or coerced employees in the exercise of the rights under Section
2 of the Law, we need not reach this issue. In general, however, we agree with
the Investigator that an employer’s good faith negotiations with the exclusive
representative would not chill a reasonable employee from engaging in activity
protected under Section 2 of the Law. See Brockton School Committee, 10
MLC 1169, 1175-1176, MUP-5050 (H.O. September 1, 1983) aff’d 11 MLC 135
(January 29, 1985).
.
18
Dorsey complains that the Investigator “stripped him of his right to an
investigation by granting the motion to dismiss without first holding an in-person
investigation.” However, neither the Law nor the DLR’s regulations guarantee
charging parties the right to an in-person investigation. Rather, Section 11(b) of
the Law and DLR Rule 456 CMR 15.05, subsections (1) and (3) expressly
authorize an investigator to dismiss the charge prior to conducting an in-person
investigation. Because we conclude that none of the arguments that Dorsey
claims he would have made had there been an investigation either establish his
standing to bring this charge or probable cause to believe that the Law has been
violated in the manner alleged, the Investigator committed no error by granting
the motion to dismiss without first conducting an in-person investigation.

11
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and fails to meet the standards and obligations of an exclusive
bargaining representative.
Attached to the charge was a lengthy bulleted list of the ways in which the
MCCC allegedly violated Sections 6, 10(b)(1) and 10(b)(2) of the Law. 19 The
crux of these allegations is that the MCCC “bargained away the rights of DCE
unit members,” transferred their bargaining unit work and failed to represent
them by not notifying them about, or including them in, the negotiation or
ratification of the Day Unit agreement pertaining to teaching hours. We turn first
to the Section 10(b)(2) allegation.
Section 10(b)(2)
Section 10(b)(2) of the Law prohibits an exclusive collective bargaining
representative from refusing to bargain in good faith with a public
employer. Massachusetts State Lottery Commission, 22 MLC 1519, 1522,
SUPL-2579 (February 16, 1996). A union’s obligation to bargain in good faith
under Section 10(b)(2) mirrors an employer’s good faith bargaining obligation
under Section 10(a)(5) of the Law. Boston School Committee, 37 MLC 214,
221, MUPL-06-4570 (May 23, 2011). Accordingly, the policies articulated in
the Pattison decision for denying standing to individual employees to enforce an
employer’s duty to bargain by bringing Section 10(a)(5) charges apply equally to
individuals attempting to enforce a union’s duty to bargain under Section
10(b)(2) of the Law. We therefore summarily affirm the Investigator’s dismissal
of the Section 10(b)(2) allegation for lack of standing. None of the cases that
Dorsey and Marks cite persuade us otherwise.
Section 10(b)(1)
Throughout this charge, Dorsey also alleges that the Union violated its
duty as his exclusive representative by the manner in which it negotiated and
ultimately agreed to the extension of the Day Unit teaching hours provision. The
Investigator dismissed this aspect of the charge for lack of standing. Relying on
both the text of Section 5 of the Law 20 and various judicial decisions, the
Investigator reasoned that when the MCCC was negotiating the Day Unit
19

The list was not separated into separate counts or otherwise categorized by
the section of the Law allegedly violated.
20

The Investigator relied on the first paragraph of Section 5, which states:
The exclusive representative shall have the right to act for and
negotiate agreements covering all employees in the unit and shall
be responsible for representing the interests of all such employees
without discrimination and without regard to employee organization
membership.
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agreement, it only owed a duty of fair representation to Day Unit members. She
therefore concluded that Dorsey and Marks, as DCE Unit members, lacked
standing to allege a DFR violation with respect to the Union’s conduct during
Day Unit negotiations and dismissed the charge on those grounds.
On review, the Charging Parties claim, for a variety of reasons, that they
have standing to bring the Section 10(b)(1) allegation. We need not reach their
arguments. Even assuming that Dorsey and Marks had standing to allege a
10(b)(1) violation under the particular circumstances of this case, the facts
adduced during the investigation do not establish probable cause to believe that
the Union violated its duty of fair representation to them in the manner alleged.
On these grounds, we dismiss this aspect of the charge.
Under the Law, a bargaining representative has a statutory duty to serve
the interests of all its members without hostility or discrimination toward any, and
to exercise its discretion in complete good faith and honesty. Local 285, SEIU
and Vicki Stultz, 9 MLC 1760, 1764, MUPL-2461 (April 5, 1983) (citing Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)). 21 Because bargaining agents’ obligations
often require representing conflicting interests, the Law grants them wide range
of reasonableness in fulfilling their statutory duties, as long as their actions are
“not improperly motivated, arbitrary, perfunctory or demonstrative of inexcusable
neglect.” Graham v. Quincy Food Service Employee Association, 407 Mass.
601, 607 (1988)(additional citations omitted). Ultimately, there must be
“substantial evidence” of bad faith that is “intentional, severe, and unrelated to
legitimate union objectives” in order to show a breach of the duty of fair
representation. Id. at 609 (citing Amalgamated Association of St., Elec. Ry. &
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 301 (1971)). In this case,
as a single union representing two different bargaining units at the same
employer, the MCCC was obliged to represent both units fairly without hostility
or discrimination, but within the wide range of reasonableness afforded to it by
the Law. For the following reasons, there is not probable cause to believe that
the manner in which the Union conducted negotiations over a topic that

21

On review, the Charging Parties reiterate their argument that the Union
“breached its fiduciary duties” owed to them and the DCE Unit. Although the
Investigator did not directly address this argument, she noted that Dorsey had
presented no cases holding that a union owes a duty to its members beyond the
duty of fair representation required by Section 10(b)(1) of the Law. None of the
cases that the Charging Parties cite on review arise under Chapter 150E or
even remotely relate to the duty that public unions owe to their members. They
therefore provide no basis to analyze the Charging Parties’ Section 10(b)(1)
claims under anything other than the well-established duty of fair representation
standard articulated above. Accord Chase v. Commonwealth Employment
Relations Board, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1103, slip op. at 3 (Unpublished Disposition,
August 28, 2015) (“The union is not a fiduciary; it is a representative.”).
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impacted both the Day and DCE bargaining units violated its duty to the DCE
Unit in any way.
As a preliminary matter, we agree for the reasons stated in the dismissal
letter that, because the DCE Unit and Day Unit are separate, not blended
bargaining units, the Union’s duty of fair representation to the DCE Unit did not
include extending to it the same rights that members of the Day Unit have under
the MCCC’s bylaws have when it comes to participating in the Day Unit
negotiations or ratifying the Day Unit agreement. We also agree that, under the
logic of parity cases, the Union was not required to negotiate for and
simultaneously represent and negotiate for the DCE unit or administer the DCE
agreement during negotiations. See, e.g., Town of Andover, 18 MLC 1311,
1313, MUP-8228 (February 25, 1997).
None of the Charging Parties’
arguments on review or the cases they cite persuade us that the Day and DCE
units, have, over time, become blended units, or that the reasons the CERB
created separate Day and DCE Units back in 1979 require us to find that the
MCCC violated its duty of fair representation towards the DCE Unit when it
negotiated an extension of teaching hours for Day Unit employees.
For similar reasons, we do not find probable cause to believe that the
Union violated its duty to DCE members by negotiating this provision on behalf
of the Day Unit without first holding bargaining sessions with the DCE Unit and
the Employer. Dorsey and Marks argue that the Union’s and Employer’s actions
amounted to a transfer of DCE bargaining unit work and the Union’s failure to
take steps to prevent this amounts to a breach of the duty of fair representation.
The Investigation record shows, however, that the teaching provision was the
result of lengthy, give and take negotiations between the Employer and the
Union, in its capacity as the Day Unit’s representative. Absent “substantial
evidence” of bad faith that is “intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate
union objectives,” the fact that the teaching time provision may have also
impacted DCE Unit members’ terms and conditions of employment does not
automatically mean that the Union violated its duty of fair representation to DCE
Unit employees when it decided to negotiate the teaching time provision with the
Day Unit without first seeking to negotiate this issue on behalf of the DCE
unit. Graham v. Quincy Food Service Employee Association, 407 Mass. at 609.
There is no such evidence here.
Rather, the Investigation record demonstrates that it was the Employer,
not the MCCC, who first made the teaching time proposal. Further, as soon as
the Employer made this proposal, the Union, recognizing that extending the Day
Unit’s teaching hours affected both Day and DCE members’ interests, rejected
the proposal. The Employer, however, insisted that extending Day Unit teaching
hours was one of its “must-haves.” The dismissal letter amply details the Union’s
efforts over the next eight months to limit the scope and impact of the proposal,
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while still attempting to reach a successor agreement on behalf of the Day Unit
to whom, we emphasize, it also owed a duty of fair representation. 22
The final product of those negotiations demonstrates these efforts. The
Employer’s original proposal would have unconditionally allowed it to schedule
Day Division classes up until 6:30 p.m. However, the Union was able to
negotiate changes that only allowed the Employer to schedule Day Division
classes only as late as 5:00 p.m., and only upon the faculty members’ and the
College’ president’s mutual consent, absent bona fide programmatic concerns.
Further, the Union insisted the MCCC Chapter be informed whenever Day Unit
members were assigned classes that started after 4:00 p.m. in order to address
issues that arose for both Day and DCE unit members. Further, when Dorsey
objected to being told that DCE Unit members could not participate in the Day
Unit’s ratification vote, the Union President asked Union counsel what the DCE
Unit’s rights were. Union counsel responded at length in a reasoned letter that
acknowledged that the Day Unit’s agreement affected DCE bargaining unit
members and explained that although this did not entitle DCE Unit members to
vote on the tentative agreement, they had other rights in this regard. This
sequence of events demonstrates that the Union took the DCE Unit’s interests
into account when negotiating the teaching time provision and addressed their
expressed concerns. Although Dorsey disagrees with the manner in which the
negotiations were handled, such behavior falls within the broad discretion
granted to unions and provides no grounds for finding a violation of the
DFR. Cf Teamsters Local 437 and James Serratore, 10 MLC 1467, 1474,
MUPL-2566 (March 21, 1984)(when investigating potential grievances, union
need not make either the best judgment or the same judgment as would have
been reached by the CERB as long as the conclusion is neither arbitrary nor
tainted by some unlawful discriminatory motivation).
There is not probable cause to believe that the Union violated its DFR to
the Charging Parties in any other way. Although they continue to argue that the
MCCC did not put DCE Unit members on notice of the Day Unit negotiations,
the investigation record contains numerous examples of the ways in which the
22

Indeed, had the teaching provision become a “deal breaker” based on the
Union’s concerns over the impact of the teaching times provision on DCE Unit
members’ interests, Day Unit members could have filed a charge making the
very same allegations that Dorsey and Marks make here. This illustrates the
quandary that unions can find themselves in when addressing the sometimes
divergent interests of their members and, thus, the need for the Law to provide a
union with latitude in negotiating solutions that are in the best interests of all
members, subject only to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the
exercise of this discretion. Marion Town Employees Association and Polly
Church, 35 MLC 173, 177, MUPL-04-4486 (January 30, 2009) (citing Trinque v.
Mount Wachusett Community College Faculty Association, 14 Mass. App. Ct.
191, 199 (1982) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)).
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Union provided such notice, including newsletters and bargaining updates.
Further, one of the members of the Day Unit’s negotiating team was also a DCE
unit member and the Board of Directors, which included twelve members who
were also members of the DCE bargaining unit, considered the provision as part
of the entire tentative agreement and recommended that it be ratified. The
Union also held Chapter meetings, which provided members of both units the
opportunity to comment on the tentative agreement. The Investigation record
demonstrates that Dorsey attended and spoke during at least one Chapter
meeting and therefore cannot be heard to complain that he or other DCE unit
members were not kept apprised or silenced when it came to Day Unit
successor negotiations.

Conclusion
For all of the foregoing reasons, the CERB affirms the dismissal of both
charges.
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
COMMONWEALTH EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD

____________________________________
MARJORIE F. WITTNER, CHAIR
____________________________________
KATHERINE G. LEV, CERB MEMBER
APPEAL RIGHTS
Pursuant to the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Quincy City Hospital v.
Labor Relations Commission, 400 Mass. 745 (1987), this determination is a final
order within the meaning of M.G.L. c. 150E, § 11. Any party aggrieved by a final
order of the Board may institute proceedings for judicial review in the Appeals
Court pursuant to M.G.L. c.150E, §11. To claim such an appeal, the
appealing party must file a Notice of Appeal with the Commonwealth
Employment Relations Board within thirty (30) days of receipt of this
decision. No Notice of Appeal need be filed with the Appeals Court.
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